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In directing us “beyond elites”, the editors of this vol-
ume invite us to consider not only whether we have 
over-estimated the centralized control that metal 
working enabled or demanded in prehistoric Europe 
but also to move beyond standard typologies of po-
litical forms and evolutionary concepts (Kienlin, this 
volume). To move beyond elites, of course, we must 
understand what constitutes an “elite” and elite so-
ciety. If we take these concepts to imply some kind 
of socially reproduced restriction on access to lead-
ership	positions	and	accompanying	social	stratifica-
tion, then we are asked to consider whether Bronze 
or Iron Age European societies operated in the ab-
sence	of	an	ascribed	hierarchy	and	significant	politi-
cal complexity.
Such a society would fall into one of three kinds 
of system: what conventional anthropological lexi-
cons refer to as “egalitarian” systems – ones in which 
neither	 leadership	 nor	 stratification	 is	 detectable;	
systems characterized by “achieved” leadership – in 
which access to leadership must be created anew in 
each generation; or some form of organization as yet 
unknown to ethnography and history. Regarding the 
latter, I am mindful of the conceptual tyranny that 
the ethnographic can exercise over the past (Wobst 
1979), but I see no warrant in this argument for sim-
ply abandoning the ethnography of societies tradi-
tionally designated as “egalitarian” or “achieved” if 
we are to improve our understandings of hierarchy in 
the past. I do concur, however, with much of the criti-
cism directed at classic concepts in social and politi-
cal evolutionism such as “egalitarian” and “achieved” 
(Kienlin, this volume). The Big Man model, which has 
played an outsized role in archaeological theorizing 
about the nature of leadership (Hayden 1995; Roscoe 
2000: 80), is a case in point. The very success of Sahl-
ins’s	model	of	the	Big	Man	has	had	the	effect	of	hy-
postatizing it. It is not just that the model reduces to a 
single stereotype what is, in reality, an extraordinary 
variety of leadership forms in small-scale society. It 
is also that this form, as Sahlins depicted it, is wrong 
in several important particulars. In essence, the Big 
Man never existed in Melanesia, let alone in prehis-
tory! 
Yet the imperfections in Sahlins’s stereotype 
should not detract from the fact that he captured sev-
eral important dimensions of a particular kind of New 
Guinea leadership. Nor should it mean that we sim-
ply jettison his model and start again from scratch. 
What it means is that we need to modify the model 
while trying to avoid hypostatizing it. In this spirit, 
I argue in this paper that the Big Man, if so we con-
tinue to designate him, was not an invariant “type” 
but rather a particular “surface” manifestation pro-
duced by distinctive social processes, which emerge 
to	ethnographic	visibility	under	specific	material	and	
demographic circumstances.
My argument is that the Big Man was not, as the 
stereotype would have him, an economic entrepre-
neur, nor were the seeds of elite control inherent in 
his most visible relationships with his followers. First 
and foremost, he was a manager, the initiator and 
principal organizer of large-scale community dis-
plays. In some areas, these displays took the form of 
conspicuous material giveaways with which the Big 
Man is stereotypically associated. They could also, 
however, take the form of large-scale exhibitions of 
singing and dancing. And under yet other circum-
stances they took the form of monument building, a 
phenomenon almost entirely overlooked in anthro-
pology but with obvious relevance to archaeology. 
In thus retooling the Big Man model, my goal is to 
erode the highly abstracted – essentialized – status 
he has assumed and represent him instead as an in-
terested agent, operating within and on a particular 
set of material, social, and cultural conditions. Absent 
these conditions, the Big Man either fails to appear 
or is impeded in reaching full ethnographic visibility. 
Vary these conditions, and he applies his managerial 
skills to material displays, the organization of con-
spicuous performances, or the construction of monu-
mental structures. 
A revised model of the Big Man is of value to the 
second charge of our editors, to rethink the political 
organization of the European Bronze and Iron Ages. 
In Old World archaeology, the Big Man has most often 
been deployed to model leadership in the Neolithic 
(e. g. Milisauskas 1978; 2002). Given the Neolithic sta-
tus of New Guinea society, the ethnographic analogy 
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is	 plausible,	 though	 it	 has	 encountered	 significant	
criticism (e. g. Spriggs 2008; cf. Roscoe 2009a; van 
der Velde 1986). To suggest, as some such as Bloem-
ers (1986) have done, that the Big Man might even 
provide a model of Old World politics into the Mid-
dle Iron Age, is all the more controversial. As a social 
anthropologist, I have no expertise to evaluate these 
debates. As a scholar of Melanesian society (e. g. 
Roscoe 2000; 2009b), however, I am in a position to 
sketch out some aspects of Big Man systems that may 
be	useful	to	others	more	qualified	to	judge	European	
prehistory.
Using a revised model of the Big Man, along with 
ethnographic data from contact-era New Guinea, his 
homeland,	 I	first	 consider	 the	conditions	 that	 facili-
tate	his	rise.	 I	find,	 in	summary,	that	the	emergence	
of Big Men to ethnographic visibility can be predicted 
with some reliability from a knowledge of the density 
of the populations in which he operated. In addition, I 
examine one property of Big Man systems that is im-
portant to identifying their presence in European pre-
history: their capacity to mobilize labour to advance 
collective	interests.	Big	Man	society,	I	find,	was	capa-
ble of mustering far more labour than is commonly 
supposed. Given the hitherto unnoticed status of Big 
Men as monument builders, therefore, it is plausible 
to consider them analogical candidates in the produc-
tion of prehistoric European features such as burial 
mounds,	 Megalithic	 monuments,	 and	 fortifications	
that more often are associated with elite control.
The “true” Big Man
Although Sahlins (1963: 285, fn.) presented his depic-
tion of the Big Man as preliminary, it has stood up re-
markably well to the passage of time. Its very success, 
however, has served to perpetuate several critical 
deficiencies.	In	Sahlins’s	telling,	there	were	four	key	
features to the Big Man: the nature of his leadership; 
his motivation; the skills that set him apart from oth-
ers; and how he used those skills to realize his goals. 
The Big Man represented the quintessential form of 
“achieved” leadership. Rather than inheriting his 
position as might a Polynesian chief, he achieved it, 
though it would be more accurate to say that he cre-
ated it: it is the “product of his own personal manu-
facture” (Sahlins 1963: 289). What motivated the Big 
Man to create his position was “status,” a desire to 
become “some sort of hero,” a “prince among men” 
(Sahlins 1963: 289, 290). To become a Big Man, there-
fore, he had to be highly ambitious and intensely 
competitive. “His every public action is designed to 
make a competitive and invidious comparison with 
others, to show a standing above the masses” (Sahl-
ins 1963: 289). 
All of this is well known and largely accurate, but 
Sahlin’s characterization of just how the Big Man 
achieved renown was less so. For Sahlins, the Big Man 
was	first	and	foremost	an	economic	entrepreneur,	a	
man	 skilled	 in	 finessing	 the	 system	 to	 his	 financial	
advantage. By capitalizing on kinship obligations 
and relations, through “calculated generosities”, by 
establishing “special personal relations of compul-
sion or reciprocity” with other Big Men (Sahlins 1963: 
290–292), and so on, the Big Man triumphed over oth-
ers in accumulating an economic surplus, most often 
of pigs, shell wealth, and foods, which he then used 
to	finance	 the	 great	 public	 giveaways	 –	 feasts,	 gifts	
of pigs, bridewealth, subsidies and compensations to 
allies – that brought him renown (Sahlins 1963: 281).
Superficially	plausible	as	this	picture	might	seem,	
it	was	deficient	in	one	key	respect.	It	elided	the	key	
role of the Big Man as an organizer of people, as a so-
cial rather than an economic entrepreneur. Focused 
on the Big Man and how he operated, it is under-
standable that Sahlins should have bracketed for ana-
lytical purposes the local social system within which 
he operated, treating it as little more than a back-
drop to his activities. So, for example, Sahlins took 
the great public giveaways that were instrumental in 
constructing the Big Man’s renown as a given, with 
no explanation for why these systems mounted such 
large-scale	events	in	the	first	place.
As I have argued elsewhere (Roscoe 2009b), how-
ever, large-scale material distributions, like other 
conspicuous forms of display, were crucial to the 
functioning of small-scale systems like those in New 
Guinea. They constituted a form of “social signaling”, 
a	 low	 cost	means	 of	managing	 conflicts	 of	 interest	
within and among allied political communities by 
faithfully communicating individual and collective 
fighting	 strength.	 In	 such	a	 system,	 individuals	 and	
sub-groups within a political community, and politi-
cal communities within an alliance of such communi-
ties, were able to establish through these displays of 
fighting	capacity	who	would	win	a	fight	to	the	death	
over mates, resources, or other interests without 
resorting to a lethal violence that would endanger 
lives and threaten community and alliance integrity. 
Those individuals, sub-groups, and political commu-
nities that prevailed in these competitive displays 
achieved dominant status and the ability to advance 
their interests against others; those who mounted in-
ferior displays were obliged to yield.
As Sahlins’s pointed out, these great public givea-
ways were vehicles by which Big Men augmented 
their reputations. What he overlooked was the central 
role that Big Men also played in initiating and organ-
izing	these	and	other	conspicuous	displays	of	fight-
ing capacity. As several Melanesianists were quick to 
point out, the Big Man was more than an economic 
entrepreneur: he was, as Burridge (1975) and Meggitt 
(1973: 193) put it, the “manager” of his local group’s 
activities. The talents that marked him out from oth-
er men – his gift for oratory or “public verbal sua-
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sion” (Sahlins 1963: 290); his skills in mediation and 
conflict	resolution;	his	charisma,	diplomacy,	ability	to	
plan, industriousness, and intelligence; his abilities 
in political manipulation (Burridge 1975: 100–102; 
Lawrence 1973: 17) – brought him renown not simply 
because they allowed him to outdo others in muster-
ing contributions for material distributions and oth-
er displays but because, and more importantly, they 
qualified him for the central role in bringing these displays 
about. His “basic skill,” as Westermann (1968: 113) put 
it of the Raiapu Enga Big Man, was “his ability to pull 
together the disperate [sic] interests of the group and 
gain from them concerted action.” For the Big Man, 
the point of conspicuous material distributions and 
other	collective	displays	was	that	they	objectified	this	
managerial ability for all to see (Burridge 1975: 92). 
They made visible in concrete and comparable terms 
his organizational and manipulative talents, allowing 
them to be calibrated against those of other Big Men 
in the perpetual competition for pre-eminent status.
The emergence of Big Men
As Godelier (1986) made clear some time ago, Big 
Men societies were the exception rather than the rule 
in New Guinea. Most leaders were not Big Men but 
Great Men, men who gained status not as managers 
or economic entrepreneurs but as warriors, hunters, 
or ritual experts.1 In a minority of further commu-
nities, most of them heavily dependent on hunting 
and gathering, leadership was even weaker or non-
existent (e. g. Townsend 1969: 8). Under what circum-
stances, then, did a society become a Big Man society 
as opposed to a Great Man or an acephalous one? 
If	we	accept	that	the	Big	Man	was	first	and	fore-
most a manager, then the question all but answers 
itself. Regardless of whether he directed his organi-
zational talents to material distributions or any other 
form of collective project, a Big Man could only be-
come ethnographically visible if he was able to display 
his organizational talents – in other words, if people 
were available whose collective labour he could man-
age. It is probable, after all, that every New Guinea 
community contained some individuals possessed of 
the ambition to rise above their fellows and of supe-
rior managerial talents. But not every community in 
New Guinea provided the expansive, organizational 
arenas that could raise these would-be “managers” to 
ethnographic visibility.
Consider, for example, a social regime of small, 
scattered communities. Under such conditions, the 
political arena amounts to just a handful of adult 
men. With so few contenders for renown and noth-
1 Sahlins (1963: 291) made a similar observation but confused 
the matter by representing these traits as further character-
istics of the Big Man.
ing but the smallest of audiences to grant it, only 
minimal gradations of status can develop, and what 
status rivalry exists is easy to overlook or misrepre-
sent as “sibling” or “family” rather than “political” 
rivalry. With so few people to be organized, moreover, 
the scale of their material distributions is necessarily 
limited, and the opportunities for an embryonic Big 
Man to display his managerial skills are therefore at-
tenuated. 
The small-scale hunter-gatherer communities 
of the Upper Tor River in West Papua provide a case 
in point. The tribes of the Upper Tor competed as 
fiercely	as	any	Big	Man	community	to	outdo	one	an-
other in feasting. “For months before such a festival 
occurs, men and women are occupied with procur-
ing the greatest amounts of food possible. The more 
one has to eat, the more people one can invite and 
the longer can the festival last. Both the duration of 
the festival and the number of guests are decisive for 
the power and prestige of the tribe” (Oosterwal 1963: 
85, my translation). But these communities were so 
small and scattered – the majority of tribes numbered 
50 to 100 people (Roscoe 2005: Appendix), i. e. 10 to 
20 politically active male members, scattered among 
several dispersed settlements – that neither their eth-
nographer nor any other analyst for that matter ever 
thought to dub them Big Man societies.
Compare this situation to the opposite, a social 
regime in which communities are large and densely 
packed. In this context, the political arena expands 
dramatically. With many men competing for renown, 
marked gradations in status can develop, and status 
rivalry	becomes	difficult	to	miss.	With	large	numbers	
of people on hand to be organized, moreover, the 
scale of material distributions expands, along with 
the opportunities for embryonic Big Men to display 
their managerial skills. In these communities, it is far 
harder for an ethnographer to overlook the activities 
of a Big Man and the status he accrues. Among the 
larger tribes of the highlands, for example, clans em-
braced hundreds of members, including well over a 
hundred politically active males, and material distri-
butions could involve hundreds of pigs killed or ex-
changed. It is no surprise, therefore, that the central 
and western highlands were the classic homeland of 
the Big Man (tab. 1).
Big Men and population  
distributions 
It follows from the foregoing that, if we are to under-
stand the circumstances that produce the Big Man 
– or, to be more precise, that elevate him to ethno-
graphic visibility – we must consider what processes 
and	 conditions	 affect	 community	 scale	 and	 settle-
ment distribution. Under what circumstances do we 
encounter small-scale, scattered communities on the 
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Group Subsistence1
Contact
density
(/km2)
2-km radius 
population
(density)
Big-Man
Society2
LAC3
Size
Aekyom Sago planting, horticultureHunting,	fishing 0.5-0.8 
26-31 
(2.1-2.5) N
Longhouse
(26-31)
Sanio Sago gatheringHunting/fishing 1.6 56 (4.5) NL
Hamlet
25
Onabasulu Sago gathering, horticultureHunting/pig-rearing 1.7 60 (4.8) N
Longhouse
60
Kaluli Sago gathering, horticultureHunting, pig-rearing 2.2 60 (4.8) N
Longhouse
60
Gebusi Horticulture, sagoHunting, pig-rearing 3.6 68 (5.4) N
Longhouse
27
Etoro Horticulture, sagoHunting, pig-rearing 3.7 70 (5.6) N
Longhouse
36
Wovan Horticulture, foragingHunting ca. 4.6 77 (6.1) N
Homestead
15
Umeda Sago planting, horticultureHunting 4.8 238 (18.9) N
Village
205
Amanab Horticulture, sago plantingHunting 5.2 95 (7.6) N
Village
85
Namie/Lujer SagoHunting,	fishing 5.9 354 (28.2) N Village (100)
Binumarien Agriculture/horticulture?Pig-rearing 7.2 125 (9.9) L
Village group
110
Baruya HorticultureHunting, pig-rearing 10.5 292 (23.2) L ?
Asabano HorticultureHunting/pig-rearing 11.4 180 (14.3) N
Longhouse
70
Telefolmin Agriculture/horticulture?Hunting/pig-rearing 11.5 299 (23.8) N
Village
133
Gnau Sago planting, horticultureHunting 13.4 300 (23.9) N
Village
270
Olo (Wape) Sago planting, horticultureHunting/pig-rearing 13.6 206 (16.4) N
Village
190
Kopon (Lower) AgriculturePig-rearing, Hunting 13.7 160 (12.7) N ?
Tauade Horticulture, pandanusPig-rearing 15.2 341 (27.1) N
Clan
27
Fore (South) HorticultureHunting, pig-rearing 19.9 232 (18.5) L
Hamlet
19
Au Sago planting, horticulturePig-rearing, hunting 26.9 565 (45.0) N
Village
202
Enga (Raiapu - Saka) AgriculturePig-rearing 28.4 1365 (108.6) Y
Clan
c.350
Wahgi (North) AgriculturePig-rearing 29.6 772 (61.4) Y
Clan
151
Wahgi (South) AgriculturePig-rearing 33.6 533 (42.4) Y
Clan
450
Enga (Raiapu – Lai) AgriculturePig-rearing 43.8 550 (43.8) Y
Clan
225
Melpa (North) AgriculturePig-rearing 55.9 1208 (96.1) Y
Clan
264
Melpa (Central) AgriculturePig-rearing 59.5 748 (59.5) Y
Clan
500-1,000
Tab. 1: Subsistence, population distribution, and Big-Men societies.
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one hand and large-scale, closely packed communi ties 
on the other? In the last several decades, geo graphers 
and sociologists have drawn attention to the crucial 
role that “time-space compression” (or “distancia-
tion”) plays in social scale. “Time-space” compression 
refers to processes that accelerate the experience of 
time	and	 reduce	 the	 significance	of	 distance	during	
a given historical moment. Technological and organi-
zational innovations that increase the velocity of hu-
man mobility and communication are the most obvi-
ous instruments of time-space compression, because 
they radically reduce the costs of bringing about hu-
man interactions while often vastly increasing their 
scalability – i. e. the degree to which they can be pro-
liferated with little or no additional cost. 
The capacity of technological and organizational 
innovations to reduce the cost of interactions and in-
crease their scalability has had two momentous con-
sequences for social evolution. First, it has enabled 
a vast expansion in the scale of those social groups 
whose	functions	profit	from	increased	size.	Defensive	
organization is a case in point. Fighting capacity in-
creases with the size of the army that a political com-
munity	can	field	and	the	scale	of	logistical	support	it	
can muster. By extending the circle of people who can 
interact and cooperate in defensive activities, there-
fore, innovations in communication and mechanical 
transportation allow defensive organizations to ex-
pand in size. Second, these innovations facilitate the 
extension of centralized political control. Using cam-
paign bus tours or barnstorming rallies at airports, 
for example, political leaders can nowadays interact 
with tens of thousands of people spread over vast dis-
tances. Via electronic and print media – through TV 
political ads, telephone push-polls, and the like – they 
can interact with millions remotely (Roscoe n. d. a.).
Things	were	very	different,	however,	 in	 commu-
nities like those of contact-era New Guinea where 
communication was exclusively oral and face-to-face 
and human mobility was by foot alone. Under these 
circumstances, as I have argued elsewhere (Roscoe 
n.	d.	a;	1993),	 the	crucial	 influence	on	the	scale	and	
frequency of human interaction is the distribution 
of population across a landscape – that is, its density, 
degree of nucleation, and extent. Where densities are 
low, the scale and frequency of interaction is tightly 
constrained by the time that agents must invest to 
bring	interactions	about	in	the	first	place.	These	con-
Chimbu (Upper) Agriculture, silviculturePig-rearing 61.3 1588 (126.4) Y
Clan
459
Enga (Kyaka) AgriculturePig-rearing 70.1 881 (70.1) Y
Clan
330
Chimbu (Central) AgriculturePig-rearing 76.8 965 (76.8) Y
Clan
645
Mendi Agriculture,Pig-rearing 78.1 1155 (91.9) L ?
Enga (Mae) AgriculturePig-rearing 111.7 1936 (154.1) Y
Clan
350
Notes:
1) Subsistence: Plant and faunal sources in order of importance; vertical bar = order of importance unknown.
Agriculture = Main crop cultivated for more than two years on the same plot, or for one to two years on the same plot followed by less 
than 10 years’ fallow; Horticulture = Main crop cultivated for one to two years on the same plot, followed by a minimum of 10 years’ 
fallow; Sago gathering = collection and processing of wild sago; Sago planting = collection and processing of planted sago.
2) Big-man society?: Y= Explicitly acknowledged or referred to as present; L = Explicitly acknowledged to be present but less developed 
than	in	“classic”	highland	big-man	societies;	said	to	be	present,	but	qualifications	made	in	reference	to	classic	model	of	(highland)	big-
men; NL= Said to have no or weakly developed leadership; N = Big Men explicitly stated to be absent.
3) LAC size: LAC = Largest autonomous community
Sources:
Aekyom – Depew 1986: 22, 34, 47–59, 63–71; Amanab – Amanab census registers; GR 3-56/57: 10–11; Juillerat 1996: xx-xxii; Asabano – Lo-
hman 2000: 29, 54–55; 2009: pers. comm.; Oksapmin census registers; OKS 1-70/71: 3; Au – Fountain 1966: 10, 53, 86, 97–98, 118; Lumi cen-
sus registers; Philsooph 1980: 64, 69, 73, 89; Baruya – Godelier 1986: 162–188; WON 8-62/63: 10–11; Big-Men societies – Allen 1984: 22; Feil 
1987: 6–7, 38, 94, 98, 111–113; Godelier 1986: 162–188; Lederman 1990: 3; Treide 1985: 169; Binumarien – Kainantu census registers; KTU 
4-47/48:	3–4;	Hawkes	1978:	161,183;	Boiken	(Yangoru)	–	Roscoe	fieldnotes;	Chimbu	(Central)	–	Brookfield/Brown	1963:	21,	43–46,	52–53,	
57,	73,	table	3;	Brown/Brookfield	1959:	44;	Kundiawa	census	registers;	Chimbu	(Upper)	–	Brookfield/Brown	1963:	122,	table	10;	Criper	
1967:	12,	15,	17,	figs.	1–3	following	pp.	27–29,	63–64;	Enga	(Kyaka)	–	Bulmer	1960:	45,	53,	81,	469–473;	1971:	241;	Enga	(Mae)	–	Meggitt	
1965: 3–4, 9; Wabag census registers; Enga (Raiapu – Lai) – Waddell 1972: 16, 39, 44, 61, 123; Wapanamanda census registers; Westermann 
1968: 69, 137–139, 144, 153; Enga (Raiapu – Saka) – Feachem 1974: 10–11; 1977:142; Wapanamanda census registers; Etoro – Kelly 1977: 
28,	fn.20,	32–33,	132,	138–139;	Schieffelin	1991:	60;	Fore	(South)	–	Glasse/Lindenbaum	1973:	376;	Kainantu	census	registers;	Sorenson	
1976: 30, 43, 54, 57, 71; Gebusi – Kelly 1993: 35; Knauft 1985: 2, 17–18; Gnau – Lewis 1975: 3, 28–29, 48–51, 344, 357; Lumi census registers 
Kaluli	–	Kelly	1993:	35;	Schieffelin	1976:	31–32,	38;	1991:	61;	Kopon	(Lower)	–	Jackson	1975:17,	39,	43,	47,	63,	186,193,286;	Melpa	(Central)	
– Burton 1988a: 2.8–2.25; Powell et al. 1975: 4–12; Strathern 1971: 230; Vicedom/Tischner n.d.: 8–9, 49, 57; 1943: 181–184, 193, 199; Melpa 
(North) – Strathern 1971: 9; 1972: 58–59; Mendi – Lederman 1990: 3, 8; Ryan 1961: 9–12; Namie – Feldpausch/Feldpausch 1988: 2, 27; Lumi 
census registers; Mitchell 1975: 417; 1977: 183; 1978: 6; Olo (Wape) – Lumi census registers; Mitchell 1978: 6, 8; Onabasulu – Kelly 1993: 35; 
Schieffelin	1981:	2;	1991:	60–61;	Sanio	–	Ambunti	census	registers;	Townsend	1969:	5,	8,	59,	65;	2002:	pers.	comm.;	Tauade	–	Hallpike	1977:	
2, 54, 61–75, 86, 139–143, 154; Telefomin – Brumbaugh 1980: 50–56, 65–68; Jorgensen 1981a: 471; 1981b: 52–53, 66; Umeda – Gell 1975: 
13, 15, 17–18; Imonda census registers; Wahgi (North) – Burton 1988b; Minj census registers; MNJ 1952: 9–10; O’Hanlon 1989: 27; Wahgi 
(South) – Burton 1988c; Minj census registers; Reay 1959: 5–6, 10, 28–33; Wovan – Flanagan 1983: 23, 25, 38, 62, 100. 
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are not like the ones found in the great societies of 
the Western Highlands who genuinely appear to be 
‘true’ big men” (Godelier 1986).
To	circumvent	these	difficulties	table	1	tracks	the	
emergence of Big Men using three sets of New Guinea 
society	(column	5).	The	first	set	(represented	as	“Y”)	
includes those societies of the western and central 
highlands whose leaders are widely if not universally 
considered classic Big Men.2 The second set of socie-
ties are those for which their ethnographer has ex-
plicitly denied the presence of Big Men (represented 
as “N”) or, alternatively, explicitly denies the pres-
ence	of	 leaders	 (“NL”).	 The	final	 social	 type	 (repre-
sented as “L”) represents societies where the ethnog-
rapher refers to leaders as “Big Men” but explicitly 
distinguishes them as less prominent or powerful 
than the classic Big Men of the western and central 
highlands (e. g. designating them as “little big-men”).
Table 1 demonstrates three things. First, as 
Bogucki (1988: 122) has pointed out, Big Men socie-
ties enjoyed a “stable [...] tremendously productive” 
environment. All of the classic Big Men societies in 
the sample were subject to minimal seasonal varia-
tions, and the introduction of the sweet potato had 
enabled them to farm their lands intensively and 
support high densities of pigs (columns 2 and 5). Only 
one society based on agriculture and pig-rearing had 
not become a Big Man society: Mendi was a “quali-
fied”	Big	Man	society.	By	contrast,	Big	Men	failed	to	
appear under less intensive regimes based on sago, 
hunting, and/or horticulture.
It is less clear whether we can credit Bogucki’s 
further claim, that the Big Man model is ecologically 
inappropriate to early neolithic Europe because its 
environment was vulnerable to “marked seasonal 
and annual variability” (Bogucki 1988: 122). If the 
argument advanced above has merit, then the more 
telling issue is not the stability or productivity of the 
environment itself but rather the level of population 
that it could support on an ongoing basis.
As table 1 indicates, there is a broad correlation 
between subsistence intensity (column 2) and crude 
population density at contact (column 3). Where sub-
sistence depended principally on hunting and sago or 
hunting and horticulture, densities did not rise above 
7 people/sq km or so. By contrast, subsistence re-
gimes based on agriculture and pig-rearing almost all 
supported populations of 30/sq km or more. Regimes 
transitional between these two forms supported den-
sities above 7/sq km and below 30/sq km. 
Thus mediated by subsistence regime, the emer-
gence of Big Men correlated strongly with population 
densities. Below crude densities of about 20 people/
sq	km,	Big	Men	were	never	sufficiently	visible	to	be	
2 Feil (1987: 96–97, 113–114) lists South Wahgi and Chimbu as 
“transitional” rather than “classic” Big Men societies. This 
contrasts with other sources, including the leading ethnog-
rapher of the Chimbu (Brown 1990).
straints have consequences both for social scale and 
political control. First, they limit the size of social 
groups. A local group that serves as a mutual defense 
organization, for example, is necessarily limited in its 
scale because, under attack, the sparsity of the popu-
lation circumscribes the number of people who can 
reach	one	another	in	time	to	render	effective	military	
aid. With a population scattered across the landscape 
at densities of between just 0.3 and 0.6/sq km (Roscoe 
2005), for example, it is no surprise that local groups 
in the Upper Tor were so small. Second, the activities 
of political entrepreneurs are also severely limited. In 
order	to	organize	and	extend	his	influence	over	oth-
ers, for instance, a would-be Big Man had to be able 
to interact with them. But in a small, low density, dis-
persed population, he would have to spend so much 
time traveling between interactions that his ability to 
build a following would be severely limited. With den-
sities so low, for example, would-be leaders in the Up-
per Tor were faced with enormous travel costs if they 
were	to	organize	and	influence	even	a	small	following.	
The	effort	was	hardly	worthwhile,	and	it	is	no	surprise	
that their political systems were so egalitarian.
Where populations are larger, denser, and/or 
more nucleated, by contrast, both social groups and 
political control can expand. Because the circle of 
individuals who can render one another mutual as-
sistance in the event of an attack increases with 
density, clans that function as mutual defense units 
can expand in size. Under high density conditions, 
moreover, people live on a would-be Big Man’s door-
step, so to speak, facilitating the extent and degree to 
which he can interact with, organize, and manipulate 
them. Among the Central Melpa, political entrepre-
neurs were surrounded by potential followers living 
at densities approaching 60 people/sq km (tab. 1). As 
we would expect, Big Men were as prominent here as 
anywhere in New Guinea, heading up clans of 500 or 
more people.
These	 theoretical	 expectations	 find	 strong	 sup-
port in the empirical evidence. Table 1 provides de-
mographic data on a selection of Big Man and non-
Big Man societies from contact-era New Guinea. It is 
not as straightforward as one might think to identify 
a Big Man society. For one thing, vernacular designa-
tions are unreliable. In most Melanesian societies, 
elder males, whatever their political status, were 
usually	 addressed	 with	 honorific	 terms	 that	 trans-
late as “big” (or “great”) “man”. To distinguish the 
“true” Big Man – i. e. Sahlins’s manager-transactor 
– therefore, it is necessary to rely on anthropologi-
cal	identifications.	But	this	only	marginally	eases	the	
task	because	the	effect	of	Sahlins’	Big	Man	article	was	
to stereotype all New Guinea leaders as Big Men. In 
consequence, many ethnographers felt compelled to 
identify leaders in the societies they studied as “Big 
Men”, even though they then ended up “wasting a 
great deal of time trying to explain that these big men 
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noted in the ethnographic record. If there were lead-
ers in these societies, they were presumably either 
Great Men or “little” Big Men. Above about 30 people/
sq km, however, Big Men become clearly visible. The 
crucial transition between egalitarian, Great Men, or 
“little Big Men” societies on the one hand and classic 
Big Men societies on the other thus occurs at densi-
ties between about 20 and 30/sq km (columns 3 and 
5).	The	point-biserial	correlation	coefficient	between	
crude density and the presence or absence of the clas-
sic Big Man is 0.74 (p<0.001), assuming ‘little Big Men’ 
(“L”) represents the absence of Big Men.
Crude density measures are, of course, poor rep-
resentations of the distribution of population across 
a landscape. They take no account of the extent of a 
population belt, its “patchiness” at a large scale, the 
degree	to	which	it	is	nucleated	or	dispersed	at	a	finer	
scale, and of whether it is distributed symmetrical-
ly (as across a uniform plain) or asymmetrically (as 
along a river or coast). Towards redress, therefore, 
column 4 uses qualitative and quantitative informa-
tion about contact-era settlement distributions to 
estimate for each society in the sample the number 
of people living within a 2 km radius of the ethnogra-
pher’s	field	location	(figures	in	parentheses	represent	
this	number	as	a	density	figure).	Where	the	number	
of people within this 2 km radius falls below about 
350 (corresponding to a local density of 27.8/sq km), 
ethnographers fail to record the presence of Big 
Men. Conversely, when the number of people within 
this radius rises above about 550 (or a local density 
of 43.8/sq km), the presence of Big Men is recorded. 
The crucial transitional regime falls between 400 and 
500 people (corresponding to local densities of about 
30.0–40.0/sq km). Using this measure, the point-bise-
rial	coefficient	of	correlation	against	presence	or	ab-
sence of Big Men increases to 0.77 (p<0.001).
There is some evidence that, as density rises, Big 
Manship takes on a degree of de facto ascription – 
though not the de jure ascription normally associated 
with	hereditary	succession.	“Sons	of	influential	men”,	
among the Central Chimbu (76.8/sq km), Bergmann 
(1971 [vol. 4]: 86) observed, “have a better prospect 
of becoming leading men than sons of mere common 
men.” In the 1960s, the sons of Northern Melpa (55.9/
sq km) Big Men had a 3:1 chance of themselves being 
Big Men (Strathern 1971: 208–212). And a similar situ-
ation may have prevailed among the Central Melpa 
(59.5/sq km), although the evidence is less clear cut 
(Vicedom/Tischner n. d.: 4; cf. Ross 1990: 137–138).
Finally, the table documents an increase of so-
cial scale with rising density. Column 6 estimates 
the contact-era size of the largest autonomous local 
polity,	 defined	 as	 the	 largest	 local	 group	 that	 acted	
in mutual defense in the event of an attack (see Ro-
scoe 2009b: 80–88). In the lowlands, this was usually 
a longhouse community or village group, in the high-
lands	more	commonly	a	clan.	It	is	sometimes	difficult	
to distinguish this polity ethnographically from local 
alliances of such polities. In the highlands, for exam-
ple, the tribe, which comprised several clans, is some-
times described as acting very much like a clan in the 
event of an attack (Roscoe 2009b: 87). To err towards 
the conservative, however, clans rather than tribes 
have been taken as the largest autonomous local pol-
ity.	 The	 Pearson	 correlation	 coefficient	 between	 lo-
cal polity size and crude, contact-era density is 0.74 
(p < 0.001), while that between polity size and popula-
tion	within	2	km	of	the	ethnographer’s	field	location	
is 0.73 (p < 0.001).
The political dynamics of Big Man 
society
One of Sahlins’s graver errors was to characterize 
the Big Man’s status and power as rooted in and lim-
ited by a “Melanesian contradiction”, a divergence of 
interests between the Big Man and his followers. In 
Sahlins’s	view,	 the	Big	Man’s	 rise	 is	financed	by	his	
faction or social group, but the fruits of their subsidy 
accrue not to them but to him. The more he strives to 
increase his eminence, therefore, the more he must 
exploit their labour until, disenchanted with the cold 
comfort of ‘eating his renown,’ they eventually desert 
him (Sahlins 1963: 292–294).
The problem with this argument is the idea that 
the Big Man extracted labour from his followers, that 
his ability lay in convincing others to produce over 
and above their own subsistence needs in his name 
(e. g. Bogucki 1988: 122). In a narrow sense, Sahlins 
was correct. In some highland societies, perhaps 5 % 
of the population laboured in a Big Man’s personal 
service, with a larger stratum of “poorer people” 
and refugees from elsewhere also partly dependent 
on him for their wellbeing.3 On these individuals at 
least, a Big Man could likely prevail to provide labour 
that advanced his interests to the detriment of their 
own. But this was not the case in a broader sense, and 
it was certainly not the case where massive material 
distributions were concerned. For Sahlins, these were 
the crucial points that exposed the contradiction be-
tween leader and follower. As a number of Melane-
sianists subsequently pointed out (Chowning 1979: 
72–73; Meggitt 1973: 193; Strathern 1971: 2, 223–224), 
however, they were nothing of the sort: followers 
benefited	as	much	from	the	activities	of	their	leader	
as he did from theirs.
3 In the Melpa tribe of Ndika, there were 181 people in the 
most menial group (“slaves”) alone – some 5 % of the total 
population of “3395 souls” (Vicedom/Tischner n. d.: 46). 
Among the Chimbu, there were “several dozen” of the equiv-
alent stratum in each tribe, some 3–5 % of adult men in the 
Kamenuku tribe (assuming “several dozen” to mean 30–50). 
It was Bergmann’s impression that this stratum was even 
larger among the denser tribes further east (Bergmann 1971 
[vol. 1]: 41; [vol. 4]: 91; Chimbu census registers for 1952–53).
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Recall that the Big Man’s ultimate interest was 
not economic but social, the pursuit of renown. It 
was not that he wanted to be wealthy; rather, he de-
sired the status that came from giving wealth away. 
As Sahlins noted in passing but failed to incorporate 
into his analysis, however, it was not just the Big 
Man who had an interest in status: so too did his lo-
cal group – his “faction”, “his people”, “other groups 
of the society at large” (Sahlins 1963: 291–293). Thus, 
we learn incidentally, tribal “rank and renown are 
developed by great public giveaways sponsored by 
the rising big-man, often on behalf of his faction as well 
as himself ” (Sahlins 1963: 291, emphasis added). It is 
“not merely his own status, but the standing and perhaps 
the military security of his people [that] depend on 
the big-man’s achievements in public distributions” 
(Sah lins 1963: 293, emphasis added). 
This is precisely as we should expect from the 
social signaling model referred to earlier. Conspicu-
ous material distributions serve as a faithful signal 
of	the	fighting	strength	not	just	of	the	Big	Men	who	
inspire and manage them but, more important yet, 
of the social group they organize. However that 
may be, the important point, as Lawrence (1973: 
14) summarized it, is that the Big Man “sets in mo-
tion culturally prescribed activities so important to 
his followers that their co-operation is automatic”. 
Big Men used their managerial abilities to advance 
their own interests in renown, but they did so in 
the service of material displays that simultaneously 
raised the status of their groups. The relationship 
between leader and group, therefore, was not a zero 
sum game based on opposition and the exploita-
tion of labour; it was a win-win situation in which 
the	efforts	of	leaders	contributed	to	the	prestige	of	
followers and vice-versa. As ethnographers of the 
Central Melpa observed at a very early moment in 
the contact history of the highlands, public deploy-
ments	of	“valuables	and	sacrificial	animals”	meant	
“prestige” for a leader, whose name became known 
“as far as the horizons”, and “at the same time for his 
group and all its members, the ‘small and the big, the 
poor and the rich, the good and the bad people’” 
(Strauss 1990: 138, emphasis added). The ideal lead-
er was supposed to “lead his people wisely and look 
after them like a father” (Strauss 1990: 140). Much of 
the work that clan members did for him was really 
“repayment” for “guarding their welfare, looking af-
ter their prestige and representing them” (Vicedom/
Tischner n. d.: 96, emphasis added).
In sum, we may assume that limits did exist on the 
degree to which followers were willing to contribute 
their labour to displays that brought renown to their 
Big Men, but these limits had nothing to do with any 
contradiction of interest. Rather, they were set by the 
scale of the social groupings and the willingness of 
members to invest their labour in return for elevating 
their status as a group. 
So just how much labour could Big Men communi-
ties mobilize? In assessing this question, it is useful 
to consider, on the one hand, the number of follow-
ers that Big Men could organize and, on the other, 
the amount of their labour followers were willing to 
contribute to large-scale display activities. Neither of 
these parameters is at all easy to gauge for contact-
era New Guinea, but it is easy enough to place a mini-
mum size on the number of followers a Big Man could 
organize. It was simply the size of his political com-
munity, and in the central and western highlands, 
this was the clan to which he belonged and whose 
activities he managed. As column 6 in table 1 shows, 
these communities ranged from about 150 to 750 or 
so, with the average falling at about 400. In terms of 
able	bodied	adults,	crudely	defined	as	individuals	be-
tween the ages of 20 and 59, this translates into a la-
bour pool that averaged roughly 200 adults, ranging 
in some communities as high as 375 or so (assuming a 
ratio of able-bodied adults to total population of 0.5).4 
The local political community, however, did not 
define	the	boundaries	of	 those	upon	whom	it	could	
draw in the service of mounting large-scale displays. 
Typically, these communities were exogamous, and 
in mounting their displays they routinely called on 
the	assistance	of	affines	 in	other	 local	communities	
(Burridge 1975: 93). The scale of this wider network 
and of the labour contributions it made is impossi-
ble to gauge from the available evidence, but we can 
derive some order-of-magnitude estimates. Suppose 
that the average completed family comprised two 
parents and either two or three children (mean fam-
ily size – i. e., family size prior to completion – var-
ied	between	four	and	five	[Meggitt 1965: 20; Waddell 
1972: 21]). Then an average Big-Man community of 
100 men (with 100 wives) would on average be linked 
to a total of between 250 and 600 adult sisters and af-
fines	who	could	be	called	on	for	help	(50–100	sisters	
+ 50–100 sisters’ husbands + 50–200 sisters’ husbands’ 
siblings + 100–200 wives’ siblings). At the outside, the 
largest Big Man communities, with as many as 375 
adults,	 would	 be	 affinally	 linked	 to	 470–1130	 adult	
sisters	and	affines	whom	they	could	call	on	for	help.
In aiding the displays of kinfolk in other commu-
nities,	these	kin	and	affines	almost	certainly	contrib-
uted considerably less of their labour than they would 
to displays sponsored by their own community. If we 
assume that this ratio was a quarter – in other words, 
that adults contributed to displays sponsored by the 
communities	of	their	kin	and	affines	only	a	quarter	of	
the labour they would contribute to displays by their 
4 If we take working adults to be those between 20 and 59, then 
in 1971, according to the Papua New Guinea census, the ratio 
of adults to total population was 0.45 (Agyei 1979: 25); in the 
late 1960’s, Waddell (1972: 24–25) found a ratio of 0.54 among 
the	Raiapu	Enga;	and	among	the	Kyaka	Enga,	the	figure	
around the same time was 0.53 (Becroft et al. 1969: 54). Let 
us therefore take the ratio of adults to total population to be 
about 0.5.
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were	held,	he	noted,	about	once	every	five	or	six	years	
(Ross 1937a: 85, 98; 1937b: 133). If we assume that the 
interval between pig kills was taken up with produc-
tion of a new pig herd for slaughter, then such a cer-
emony represented a labour investment by a tribal 
community of some 4,400 people of somewhere be-
tween 4,576,000 and 11,880,000 adult hours, depend-
ing on whether we assume an investment/adult/
week of 8 or 18 hours, respectively.6
The Big Man as monument builder
As Lindstrom (1981: 903) has pointed, Sahlins’s model 
of the Big Man took hold in an era when it was ana-
lytically popular to reduce politics to economics: in 
the case of New Guinea, this perspective translated 
into “the exchange of pigs for authority, when most 
simply put.” If this is so, then it helps account for Sa-
hlins’s reduction of Melanesian politics to economic 
transaction and his representation of the Big Man as 
someone	whose	renown	derives	from	his	skills	in	fi-
nessing	flows	 of	material	wealth.	 As	 I	 have	 tried	 to	
make clear, however, the Big Man was more than an 
economic entrepreneur. He was an organizer. It is 
certainly the case that, in the central and western 
highlands, he applied his managerial skills to the 
economic realm and the organization of conspicuous 
material distributions. But, as Meggitt pointed out, he 
tended “to take the lead not only in purely economic 
affairs	but	also	 in	 the	whole	range	of	activities	 that	
the group considers to be important [...]. In short, 
leadership in these societies generally is multiplex as 
well as achieved” (Meggitt 1973: 193). Among other 
activities, according to Meggitt, Big Men dominated 
military planning and the negotiation of truces, they 
organized trading voyages and commissioned per-
formances of magic and sorcery. In the highlands, 
we might add, Big Men also applied their managerial 
skills to the organization and management of what I 
have elsewhere called (Roscoe 2009b: 95–96) conspic-
uous performances: large, elaborately choreographed 
exhibitions of singing, dancing, and music, frequently 
mounted by spectacularly decorated performers, that 
commonly accompanied conspicuous material distri-
butions in these societies (O’Hanlon 1989). 
The one form of display that highland Big Men so-
cieties did not pursue, however, was the third form 
found in New Guinea – conspicuous construction. 
This is unfortunate because it has diverted atten-
tion away from the instrumental role that Big Men 
played in the construction of monuments, precisely 
6 Assuming a working adult to total population ratio of 0.5 (see 
above), then the Mokei tribe comprised some 2,200 adults. 
If these adults were investing 8–18 hours of work/week in 
pig	production,	it	follows	that	over	five	to	six	years	(260–300	
weeks) their total labour investment in pigs was somewhere 
between 4,476,000 and 11,880,000 hours.
own – then the average Big-Man community could 
muster the labour equivalent of about 260–350 adults. 
At the outside, the largest Big Man communities might 
muster the labour equivalent of about 490–660 adults.
If	it	is	difficult	to	estimate	the	scale	of	the	labour	
force on which a Big-Man community could draw, it 
is even more challenging to gauge the total amount 
of labour they invested. Some idea of the magnitude 
of person hours involved, however, can be derived 
from Hide’s (2003) valuable compilation of data on 
New Guinea pig production. In Big Men communities 
– indeed, in most New Guinea societies – pigs were 
raised not for domestic consumption but for ceremo-
nial purposes: marriage ceremonies, war compensa-
tion payments, pig exchanges, pig kills, and so on. The 
labour invested in pig production, therefore, can be 
roughly equated to the labour invested in the deploy-
ment of pigs in conspicuous material distributions.
Pigs made heavy demands on highland tuber pro-
duction. Figures for the Raiapu Enga and Sina Sina 
suggest, in fact, that 2.3 to 3.9 adult hours were re-
quired per week to fodder a pig (Hide 2003: 63–70).5 
Other	 quantifiable	 pig-rearing	 tasks	 added	 another	
0.5 to 1.67 hours/pig, for a total of about 3.8 to 5.6 
adult hours/week (Hide 2003: 95–96). In the 1950’s – 
the	earliest	years	 for	which	we	have	reliable	figures	
– the Chimbu and Enga raised 1.0 to 1.6 pigs/head of 
population or 2.0 to 3.2 pigs/adult, assuming a ratio 
of able-bodied adults to total population of 0.5 (see 
above).	These	figures	indicate	that	in	round	numbers	
adults invested, somewhere between 8 and 18 hours/
week in pig production.
A pig kill mounted by the three or so clans of the 
Mokei Melpa tribe around 1935 provides some indica-
tion of the scale of display that these kinds of labour 
investment could produce. According to Father Wil-
liam Ross, who witnessed the event, some 700 pigs 
were killed in the space of a single day, producing a 
weight of pork in excess of 20 tons. These ceremonies 
5 Hide (2003: 95) notes that, in 1972–73, adult men and women 
in Sinasina spent an average of 12 and 20 hours/week re-
spectively on food production. Among the Raiapu Enga, the 
equivalent	figures	were	15	hours/week	for	adult	men	and	
26 hours/week for adult women.  In 1971, the ratio of adult 
males to adult females in PNG was 561,292/536,583 (Agyei 
1979: 25). If we suppose the same ratio held among the Si-
nasina and Raiapu Enga, then the average number of hours/
adult/week put into food production was 15.9 hours/adult/
week among the Sinasina and 20.4 hours/adult/week among 
the Raiapu Enga. Among the Sinasina, pigs consumed 53 % of 
total sweet potato production; among the Raiapu Enga, 64 % 
(Hide 2003: 65–66). Of the hours/week each adult put into 
food production, therefore, the amount that went to support 
pigs would be roughly 15.9 x 0.53 = 8.4 hours in Sinasina and 
20.4 x 0.64 = 13.1 hours among the Raiapu Enga. There were 
1.8 pigs/person among in Sinasina and 1.7/person among the 
Raiapu Enga (Hide 2003: 95). Assuming the ratio of adults to 
total population was about 0.5 (see above), this means there 
were about 3.6 pigs/adult worker in Sinasina, and 3.4/adult 
worker	among	the	Raiapu	Enga.	These	figures	indicate,	there-
fore, that in Sinasina adult workers devoted about 8.4/3.6 
= 2.33 hours/pig/week to producing pig food; among the 
Raiapu	Enga,	the	equivalent	figure	was	about	13.1/3.4	=	3.85.
50 Paul Roscoe
mobilizing factions at times of crisis or opportunity” 
(Tuzin 1991).
As in the highlands, Maprik leaders were instru-
mental in managing the economic production of 
their communities: they transacted shell valuables 
and organized the production and competitive pres-
entation of commodities such as pigs, giant yams, 
and other foods (e. g. Roscoe 1989; Kaberry 1941: 356; 
Tuzin 1976: 244–248). They were also noted for their 
“knowledge of ceremonial” (Forge 1970: 270) and for 
their sponsorship and organization of performances 
of song and dance that attended these ceremonies 
(Roscoe n. d. b). In contrast to their highland counter-
parts, however, these Big Men were also instrumental 
in the competitive construction of enormous spirit 
houses that characterized much of the Maprik region.
These spirit houses were large tetrahedral struc-
tures that showcased enormous triangular façades 
that were cantilevred, richly painted, and elaborately 
adorned with plastic art (e. g. Hauser-Schäublin 1989: 
487–522; Roscoe 1995; Tuzin 1980). A typical structure 
near Maprik station was about 100 feet high and 30 
feet across its base, the painted façade beginning 20 
feet above the ground. “Then there was a row of round, 
carved and brightly painted wooden faces right across. 
Above	that,	and	all	the	way	to	the	peak,	were	flat	sewn-
together sheets of smooth sago-palm bark, and these 
were painted in the way that makes the native art of 
the Sepik region the most dramatic and dynamic in the 
whole South Seas” (Simpson 1955: 35).
Construction of these structures demanded an 
enormous investment of labor, a complex organiza-
tion of tasks, and a developed architectural knowl-
edge and expertise. Rough estimates suggest that 
their construction involved somewhere between 
3,500 and 10,000 person days of work, not counting 
the kind of conspicuous display most likely to sur-
vive in the archaeological record. Monument build-
ing was widespread in New Guinea, but it was found 
in the lowlands rather than the highlands, reaching 
its grandest scale along the coast and estuaries of the 
Papuan Gulf, the Middle and Lower Sepik River, and 
the Maprik area of the Sepik Basin. These are areas 
seldom associated with Big Men, and yet on closer 
examination	we	find	leaders	whose	managerial	skills	
and prominent role in organizing the collective activ-
ities of their local communities were similar in every 
respect to highland Big Men save for the particular 
range of collective activities involved.
Consider, for example, the Maprik region of the 
Sepik Basin, running from Yangoru in the east to Ila-
hita in the west. Unlike highland Big Men societies, 
the Boiken, Abelam, and Arapesh peoples of this re-
gion were horticulturalists rather than agricultur-
alists. Nonetheless, their subsistence regimes sup-
ported population densities that rivaled those of the 
central and western highlands (tab. 2). As we might 
expect under these demographic regimes, the lead-
ers of these communities boasted the same suite of 
managerial skills associated with the Big Man. They 
were noted for their generosity, their ability to speak 
eloquently	 and	 to	mediate	 conflict,	 their	 “cool	 and	
calculating disposition”, and their capacities as “so-
cial entrepreneurs” or organizers.7 They were men, 
in Forge’s (1970a: 271) words, possessed of “a broader 
vision and a better understanding of the political sys-
tem than the ordinary villager,” and it was they who 
led “in the formulation of public policy governing 
secular matters” and who loudly took “the fore in 
7 Forge 1970a: 270–271; Kaberry 1941/42: 355; Roscoe n. d. b; 
Scaglion 1985: 81; Schroeder 1992: 94–95; Tuzin 1978: 62.
Group Subsistence
Contact
density
(/km2)
2km radius 
population
(density)
LAC
Size
Abelam (Eastern) 
  – Wingei
  – Bengaragum/Sagisak
Horticulture, sago planting
Pig-rearing
28.6
13.5
914 (72.7)
724 (57.6)
Village
231
295
Arapesh (Ilahita) Horticulture, sago planting
Pig-rearing
44.2 1292 (102.8) Village
1292
Abelam (Central) Horticulture, sago planting
Pig-rearing
61.5 814 (64.8) Village
348
Abelam (North Wosera) Agriculture, sago planting
Pig-rearing
64.6 890 (70.8) Village
246
Boiken (Yangoru) Horticulture, sago planting
Pig-rearing
73.3 646 (51.4) Village
152
Notes: 
As for Table 1.
Sources:
Subsistence: Abelam (Central) – Kaberry 1941/42: 81, 83; 1973: 40; Maprik census registers; Abelam (Eastern) – Forge 1970b: 269–270; 
Maprik and Yangoru census registers; Abelam (North Wosera) – Lea 1965: 197–205; Maprik census registers; Schroeder 1992: 68–69; 
Arapesh (Ilahita) – Tuzin 1976: 7; Maprik census registers; Boiken (Yangoru) – Roscoe n. d. b; Yangoru census registers.
Table 2: The Big Men communities of the Maprik region, Sepik Basin.
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façades were a particular engineering triumph for the 
ingenious manner in which their weight was support-
ed on counter-sprung beams hidden beneath the roof 
(Hauser-Schäublin 1989: 95–147; Tuzin 1980: 116–166).
Like the great material distributions characteris-
tic of the highlands, cult house construction permit-
ted leaders and followers objectively to demonstrate 
their “strength”, their capacity to get things done. 
With their peaks towering among the tree tops, the 
sheer size and quantity of materials they embodied 
were an incontrovertible demonstration of the labour 
the sponsoring group could muster and of their ca-
pacity to function as a group. Simultaneously, they 
objectified	 in	 a	 concrete	 and	 comparative	 form	 the	
managerial capacity of the leaders who inspired and 
organized their construction (Kaberry 1941/42: 355; 
Roscoe 1995: 6–7; Tuzin 1991). “The names of men 
who built them were greatly raised,” one old Yangoru 
Boiken man told me. “Whoever did not make them, 
their names were not elevated” (Roscoe 1995: 7).
Conclusion
In the absence of elites and elite control, social sys-
tems can take many forms. Big Man society is one 
such form, and in this chapter I have attempted to 
make three points that may be of use to Old World ar-
chaeologists. First, the Big Man is foremost a manag-
er, an organizational entrepreneur, and only second-
arily a transactor of material goods. Second, under 
the uncircumscribed conditions that obtained in New 
Guinea, he does not become ethnographically visible 
until crude population densities rise above 30/sq km 
or so. The maximum crude densities under which he 
is known to have operated were around 110 people/
sq km, at which point elements of de facto ascription 
may be apparent in his rise to prominence. Given the 
uncircumscribed status of most European prehistoric 
environments, Big Man systems are thus plausible 
analogical candidates for political society wherever 
similar demographic regimes prevailed in the Neo-
lithic and metal ages.
Third, I have attempted to estimate the capac-
ity of Big-Man communities to mobilize collective 
labour for certain types of political task. In contrast 
to Sahlins’s assertion that a contradiction existed 
between the Big Man and his followers, major col-
lective projects such as material distributions, per-
formances of singing and dancing, and monument 
building involved them in a symbiotic relationship 
based on their common interests in communicating 
fighting	capacity	to	other	 individuals	and	groups.	 It	
is a graphic instance of Kienlin’s suggestion (this vol-
ume) that there are subtle forms of power that build 
up from “below”, often with a much stronger im-
pact on the individual’s life than “political” author-
ity. It also documents Kienlin’s further assertion that 
the labor invested in the numerous, free-standing 
masks and carvings that adorned their interiors and 
exteriors (Hauser-Schäublin 2002: pers. com.; Tuzin 
1980: 166, fn. 45).8 What evidence we have indicates 
that a Northern Abelam village with 520 people 
would have six to eight cult houses at any one time, 
representing a total labour investment of somewhere 
between 168,000 and 800,000 hours. Order-of-mag-
nitude calculations suggest that this investment cor-
responds to about 0.8–5.9 hours/week by each adult 
worker.9	This	figure	is	less	than	the	8–18	hours	of	la-
bour invested per week in pig production by the av-
erage adult Mokei worker (see earlier), but it should 
be noted that, among the Northern Abelam, commu-
nal modes of display were more diverse than in the 
central highlands. In addition to cult house construc-
tion, the Northern Abelam also produced a wealth of 
freestanding artwork to adorn these structures, along 
with pigs and long yams for ceremonial exchange. It 
is impossible to estimate the labour involved in these 
further activities, but, if they could be taken into ac-
count, it is plausible that an Abelam adult’s labour in-
vestment in ceremonial activities would approximate 
a highland adult’s investment in pig production, the 
main ceremonial activity there.  
Like highland pig festivals, these spirit houses were 
a means by which a Big Man could “show a standing 
above the masses.” In the Maprik region, artistic abil-
ity was a common distinguishing attribute of lead-
ership (Forge 1970a: 270; Tuzin 1978: 62), but these 
structures were  important in the emergence of a Big 
Man because they  demonstrated his managerial skills 
in organizing their construction, which depended on 
a relatively complex organization of labor. It was nec-
essary to synchronize the sequential arrival of many 
different	types	of	building	material,	 to	manage	their	
incorporation into the structure, and to coordinate 
the activities of the artistic specialists who painted 
and carved their façades and ornamentation. The 
most	difficult	tasks,	the	emplacement	of	the	massive	
ridgepoles and the façades, demanded especially large 
and well coordinated teams of workers. Finally, a re-
fined	knowledge	of	structural	mechanics	–	of	founda-
tioning, support, and cross-bracing – was required to 
ensure	that	the	structures	could	withstand	the	effects	
of gravity and cross winds. The great cantilevered 
8	 These	may	be	under-estimates.	On	the	Sepik	River,	Ruff	et	al.	
(1981: 30–32) estimated that it would require about 30,000 
person days to replace a Iatmul cult house in Kanganam vil-
lage that was destroyed in a 1980 earthquake.
9 Prior to World War 2, Neligum, a village of about 550 
residents, and Kalabu, a village of about 490 people, had 
approximately six and eight cult houses at any one time 
(Kaberry 1971: map 2,48; Scaglion 1976: 70–75). Assuming that 
a structure required 3,500 to 10,000 person days of labour to 
construct, that it was replaced every 10–15 years, and that 
a person day of labour represented between 8 and 10 hours, 
then the average adult worker in Neligum and Kalabu, with 
an average population of 520 residents, or 260 working adults, 
invested between 0.8 and 5.9 hours of labour/week to produce 
the six to eight cult houses on display in each village.
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small-scale societies are capable of mounting major 
political undertakings in the absence of elite control. 
Big	Men	systems	in	New	Guinea,	I	find,	were	capable	
of mustering labour pools on the order of 260 to 350 
adults	or	their	equivalent.	And	though	it	is	difficult	to	
gauge the total amount of labour they could muster, 
evidence suggests that such a system could routinely 
produce collective displays embodying millions of 
hours of adult labour.
It must be stressed that these projects were of a 
very	specific	type:	displays	capable	of	reliably	signal-
ing	both	 individual	 and	 collective	fighting	 capacity.	
As such, they are potential analogies for the political 
processes that generated prehistoric enterprises such 
as	fortification	and	mound	building.	Fortification	had	
practical	implications,	of	course,	for	fighting	capacity	
(Roscoe 2008): the more impregnable a community, 
the more it could endure attack, and hence the stron-
ger	 its	 fighting	 capacity.	 Because	 these	 properties	
would	be	apparent	to	observers,	though,	fortification	
also served to communicate this capacity. Mound-
building had few if any practical implications for 
fighting	capacity,	but	by	demonstrating	 in	 indexical	
form a community’s capacity to mobilize large-scale 
labour and focus it on a single, collective purpose, it 
was a reliable signal of critical elements of that com-
munity’s	fighting	capacity	(Roscoe	2009b:	96,	98).
The aspects of Big Man society that I have exam-
ined here do not, of course, exhaust the relevancies 
that Big Man society may have for European prehisto-
ry. There may also be signatures that speak to the per-
sonal power of Big Men rather than to their capacity 
to mobilize labour for collective goals. Big Men, it will 
be recalled, commanded a personal retinue of wives, 
dependents, and refugees greater than that of ordi-
nary men. Modest though this retinue perhaps was, 
its European counterparts may still have left archaeo-
logical signatures. By virtue of its greater size and the 
labour pool it represented, for example, the scale of a 
Big Man’s retinue was likely manifest in homesteads 
that were larger than the average. Where personal 
decoration was concerned, moreover, the New Guinea 
equivalent of metal working was an exquisite artistry 
based on shell, feathers, and basketwork, and Big Men 
appear to have possessed more elaborate and intricate 
versions of these adornments than ordinary men. Fi-
nally, further research is merited to see whether the 
differential	 treatment	 of	 Big	Men	 in	mortuary	 rites	
can be used to distinguish their presence from that of 
elites in the archaeological record.
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